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Capital Structure in Small Manufacturing Firms: Evidence
from the Data

Susan Coleman*
University of Hartford

This article examines theories of capital structure pertaining to small firms and looks at the
capital structure of small to mid-sized manufacturing firms within the context of those theories.
Results provide support for Leland and Pyle’s (1977) Signaling Theory, Myers’ (1984) Pecking
Order Theory, Berger and and Udell’s (1998) Life Cycle Theory. Contrary to the findings of
prior research, these results revealed that industry sector was not a significant determinant of
capital structure. Rather, these findings show that capital structure in small to mid-sized firms
is determined by measures of firm size, firm age, organizational status, profitability, and asset
structure.
I.

The Role of Manufacturing in the U.S. Economy
Manufacturing firms are defined as those establishments “engaged in the mechanical,
physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into new
products” (Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2006). According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
there were 378,142 manufacturing firms in the United States in 2004. These firms employed
13.4 million individuals for a total payroll of $569.2 billion. Although employment in the
manufacturing sector declined by almost 18 percent in the decade from 1995 to 2005,
manufacturing continues to play an important role in the U.S. economy.
In terms of production, manufacturing firms shipped $4.3 billion in goods in 2004
representing 12.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product (Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2006).
The largest industries within the manufacturing sector are food manufacturing, computer and
electronics, motor vehicles and parts, fabricated metals, chemicals, and machinery. In spite of
employment declines, productivity growth in manufacturing has been consistently stronger than
*

Susan Coleman is the Ansley Professor of Finance at the University of Hartford. She teaches courses in both
corporate and entrepreneurial finance at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Her research interests include
small firm capital structure as well as research on women-owned and minority-owned small firms.

106

Capital Structure in Small Manufacturing Firms… (Coleman)

productivity growth in any other sector. Throughout the 80s and 90s, in fact, manufacturing
productivity grew at twice the rate of productivity for all sectors overall (The Facts About
Modern Manufacturing, 2003).
Manufacturing is an important source of innovation, or the development of new products,
technologies, and processes. According to a report published by the National Association of
Manufacturers, 62 percent of the research and development spending in the United States in the
year 2000 was undertaken by the manufacturing sector (The Facts About Modern
Manufacturing, 2003). Manufacturing firms also stimulate the economy through capital
expenditures, or the purchase of facilities, equipment, and machinery. In 2004, the
manufacturing sector generated capital expenditures of $114.4 billion (Annual Survey of
Manufactures, 2006).
Manufactured goods account for a high percentage of exported goods, $782 billion or 61
percent of the total in 2005 (Facts About U.S. Manufacturing, 2006). In this sense, the
manufacturing sector is more globalized than other sectors of the economy. In terms of
exports, the dominant industries are computers and electronics and transportation equipment.
Many small, as well as large firms, are involved in international trade which gives them access
to new customers, markets, and sources of supply. Approximately one-third of the exports of
manufactured goods are produced by smaller firms (Today’s Small and Medium
Manufacturers, 2001).
On average, workers in the manufacturing sector are more highly compensated than
workers in other sectors. In 2003, the average manufacturing compensation in the U.S. was
$40,762 compared to $35,634 for all sectors (2003 County Business Patterns, 2006).
Manufacturing is also important because of the “multiplier effect”, or its ability to generate
other jobs in the economy. According to the National Association of Manufacturers, the
manufacturing sector has a multiplier effect of 1.43 compared to .71 for the service sector (The
Facts About Modern Manufacturing, 2003). Thus, every $1 of manufacturing product sold
generates an additional $1.43 of intermediate economic output.
Surprisingly, a very high percentage, over 98 percent, of manufacturing firms fit the U.S.
Small Business Administration’s definition of a small business, or a firm with 500 or fewer
employees (County Business Patterns, 2003). According to the National Association of
Manufacturers, smaller firms employ approximately half of all manufacturing employees and
account for over one-third of manufacturing sales and receipts (Today’s Small and Medium
Manufacturers, 2001). These firms are typically family-owned and operated. Many are
organized as S-corporations meaning that profits and losses flow through to the individual
shareholders, i.e. the owners and key managers. Typically the owner/managers reinvest a
substantial portion of profits into the firm in the form of machinery, equipment, or technology.
Their personal wealth and prosperity are thus closely tied to that of their firm and its industry.
These smaller firms and their capital structure decisions serve as the focal point for this
research.
II.

Capital Structure Theory and Small Manufacturing Firms
Capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity used by firms to finance their longterm (fixed) assets. Debt is capital that has been loaned by other parties and must be repaid. In
contrast, equity represents the investment made by owners or shareholders and is a permanent
source of capital. As with other inputs to the firm, i.e. labor, equipment, facilities, both debt
and equity have a cost. The mix of long term debt and equity is referred to as the firm’s capital
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structure. The blended cost of the various sources of long term debt and equity is referred to as
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Within the field of finance, capital structure theory is grounded in the work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) who initially wrote on the subject of capital structure in the
electric utility industry. This theory, henceforth referred to as M&M, contends that firms will
select the mix of debt and equity that maximizes the value of the firm and minimizes its
weighted average cost of capital, both of which, in their theory, occur simultaneously. M&M’s
work was groundbreaking at the time, and has served as the basis for capital structure theory
for almost fifty years.
Unfortunately, however, M&M does not necessarily hold for small privately held firms,
because it is based on the assumption that there are no transaction costs of any kind and that
investors and managers have the same information about the firm. Further, it assumes that
firms have access to the full range of debt and equity alternatives. In fact, however, the cost of
issuing public debt or equity is prohibitive for small firms, and informational asymmetries
abound. Unlike, larger, publicly held firms, small firms typically do not have the option of
issuing shares and bonds. Thus, they tend to be heavily reliant on other sources of capital
including bank loans, trade credit, personal sources of capital, and, in some instances,
governmental sources of funding.
Leland and Pyle (1977) put forth a “signaling” theory. They noted that the problem of
asymmetric or incomplete information in small firms makes it difficult for lenders to accurately
assess the level of risk. Thus, an entrepreneur’s willingness to invest in his own firm serves as
a signal regarding the quality of the firm’s assets and earnings prospects. In privately held
firms, in particular, owners, as insiders, have superior information regarding the condition of
the firm compared to outside lenders or investors. The implication of this is that firm owners
who are confident about the prospects of their firm will be more willing to invest their own
funds, retain earnings, or take on external debt as opposed to seeking external equity investors
who would desire a share of future earnings and profits.
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) developed a “pecking order” theory of
finance. According to this theory, insiders have information about the firm that outsiders do
not necessarily have. Because of this informational asymmetry, outside share purchasers will
tend to under-price a firm’s shares. In light of that, insiders prefer to use internal equity in the
form of retained earnings or debt before they resort to issuing external equity. As noted by
Coleman and Cohn (2000), the pecking order theory is particularly applicable to firms that are
small and privately held, precisely because the informational asymmetries are so large. Since
small, privately held firms do not publish annual reports or submit reports to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, their financial statements are not publicly available. Thus, outsiders
have no way of knowing the financial condition of the firm. Their response to this lack of
information is to assume a higher level of risk, and in turn, to demand a higher cost for equity
capital. External equity is very costly for small, privately held firms, and is typically their last
choice in terms of financing alternatives.
Berger and Udell (1998) put forth a “life cycle” theory of financing which contends that
firms use different types of financing for different stages of growth. They noted that small,
privately held firms, in particular, are “informationally opaque”. Thus, they have a difficult
time obtaining external sources of financing and tend to be more reliant on insider financing
such as the personal financial resources of the firm owners, and, in instances where the firm is
profitable, retained earnings. According to Berger and Udell, when firm owners do have to

108

Capital Structure in Small Manufacturing Firms… (Coleman)

turn to external sources of financing, their preference is for debt rather than equity, because
debt does not require them to give up ownership or control of the firm.
Ang (1992) also addressed the problem of asymmetric information and its implications
for smaller firms. He noted that one of the basic assumptions in M&M is for “perfect markets”
which assume that investors and managers have the same information about the firm. In the
case of small, privately-held firms, however, insiders obviously have access to information that
outside investors do not have access to. In light of this informational deficit, small firms may
have a more difficult time securing external sources of financing, or, if they are able to obtain
financing, the cost of capital will be higher.
III.

Prior Research Involving Small Firms
How do these various capital structure theories actually play out in studies involving
small firms? Holmes and Kent (1991) conducted a study of almost 3,000 small Australian
manufacturing firms to find that the most common types of financing were bank loans and
supplier credit, both short term sources. They concluded that their results provided support for
Myers’ Pecking Order Theory in that owners do not want to dilute their ownership claim by
taking on additional external equity. Similarly, when they use debt, they prefer to use short
term sources which are less restrictive in terms of covenants. Interestingly Holmes and Kent
also found that firms at the smaller end of the spectrum in their study were less aware of
possible sources of financing than larger firms. They referred to this as the “knowledge gap”
and noted that the owner/managers of smaller firms do not have the time to research financing
alternatives beyond the fairly obvious and traditional sources.
In a study of over 900 small U.S. firms, Chaganti, DeCarolis, and Deeds (1995) found
that owners who felt confident about the future of their firms preferred to use internal equity
rather than debt or external equity. They concluded that their findings supported Myers’
Pecking Order Theory, and that the use of internal equity by optimistic business owners has a
signaling effect regarding the prospects of the firm. In this sense, their findings were consistent
with the earlier work of Leland and Pyle (1977) as well.
Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson (1996) also found support for the Pecking Order
Theory in a study involving over 3,000 small British firms. They found that profitable small
firms funded their operations with retained earnings, while less profitable firms funded them
with debt. In turn, smaller, younger firms that have not established a track record of
profitability tend to rely on short term rather than long term debt. Chittenden et al. concluded
that Modigliani and Miller’s theory of capital structure would not hold for small firms because,
for them, access to capital is a major issue. Many small firms simply do not have access to the
full range of debt and equity alternatives.
Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris (1998) authored a very interesting study in
which they conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of thirty small U.S. companies. They
found that firms preferred not to raise external equity in particular, because they did not want to
dilute control. Their findings revealed that retained earnings were the most important source of
financing followed by trade credit and then bank loans, consistent with Myers’ Pecking Order
Theory. They also found that growth-oriented firms were more likely to use external sources of
financing, because they had exhausted their internal sources of capital.
Two studies using data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances provide
support for Berger and Udell’s life cycle theory of financing which states that the various
stages of firm size and growth have an impact on the types of capital required. Using data on
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approximately 4,000 U.S. firms included in the 1993 National Survey of Small Firm Finances,
Cole and Wolken (1995) found that only one-quarter of the smallest firms but three-quarters of
the largest firms used bank loans. Thus, smaller firms were much more likely to rely on
internal sources of financing. Similarly, Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald, and Gardiner (2005)
found that larger firms were more likely to use public equity and long term debt than smaller
firms. As in the Cole and Wolken study, they found that smaller firms were more reliant on
insider financing leading them to conclude that both firm size and age are linked to the types of
financing used.
In a study of small Greek manufacturing firms, Voulgaris et al. (2004), examined the
link between asymmetric information and the use of debt. They noted that the problem of
information asymmetry is more severe for small firms causing lenders to rely more heavily on
collateral. Their findings revealed that firm size was positively related to the use of both total
debt and long term debt. Conversely, smaller firms were more reliant on short term debt. The
authors concluded that larger firms have better access to long term debt due to greater
credibility and the ability to provide collateral.
A somewhat older, but important study by Edgar Norton (1991) addressed the role of
owner preferences in the selection of capital sources. Norton surveyed over one hundred high
growth small firms to find some support for the Pecking Order Theory; firms used internal
sources of financing before turning to external sources. Norton also found, however, that half
of the firms responding had target debt to equity ratios of less than 50 percent, and one-third
indicated a desire for no debt or minimal debt. Based on his findings, he concluded that
managerial preferences play a role in the capital structure decision-making. Hutchinson (1995)
echoed this observation by noting that capital constraints may be driven by demand side
considerations as well as by supply side difficulties. He observed that the owner/managers of
small firms tend to be risk averse and also want to avoid dilution of ownership. Thus, they are
averse to using outside sources of equity that would dilute ownership control, preferring debt,
typically in the form of bank loans. These same owner/managers are then attracted to low risk
and low growth projects that provide more predictable cash flows in order to service their debt.
The upshot of these preferences is that the owner/managers of small firms avoid external
sources of capital, particularly external equity, and they also avoid higher risk types of projects
which might lead to higher rates of growth.
Several studies indicate that industry sector has an effect on capital structure. Different
industries require different levels and types of assets which may, in turn, dictate different
sources of financing. In keeping with this theory, Bradley et al. (1984) used Compustat data
for the period of 1962-81 to find that fifty-four percent of the variation in firm leverage could
be explained by industry classification. They also found significantly more variation in mean
leverage ratios across industries rather than within industries. Hall et al. (2000) had similar
findings in a study of 3500 small, privately owned British firms. In that study, manufacturing
firms had significantly higher levels of leverage than firms in the education and hospitality
industries. Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias (2000) studied a sample of 445 Spanish firms to
find that both size and industry sector had an effect on the types of financing used. They
concluded that small firms actually operate without a target capital structure and prefer forms
of financing that minimize intrusion such as personal savings, retained earnings, and debt.
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IV.

Empirical Analysis
Data for this study were drawn from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF) which is conducted by the Federal Reserve every five years. The 1998 Survey is the
most recent for which data are publicly available. It includes financial statement data and
information on the use of financial products and services for 3,561 small firms in the United
States. In this instance, a small firm is defined as one having 500 of fewer employees.
According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, over 95 percent of U.S. firms fall into
that category (Frequently Asked Questions, 2005). The SSBF is the largest and most
comprehensive data set of its type representing a national sample of firms stratified by
geographic region, industry sector, gender, and race. Sample weights were provided to allow
for population estimates, and those weights have been used in this analysis.
A.
Univariate Comparisons
Table I provides univariate comparisons for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms for variables of interest. Within the data sample, there were 389 firms classified as
manufacturing firms and 3,172 firms classified as belonging to other industry sectors. Table I
reveals that the manufacturing firms were significantly larger than non-manufacturing firms in
terms of total assets, total sales, and total number of employees. Median values for assets,
sales, and number of employees were considerably lower for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms, however, indicating that results for both were skewed by the presence of
larger firms. As an example, the mean value for Total Assets for manufacturing firms was
$958,838 while the median value was a considerably more modest $96,977. Nevertheless,
manufacturing firms were still larger than non-manufacturing firms in terms of median values
as well. Table I also reveals that manufacturing firms were somewhat older than nonmanufacturing firms, although the difference was not statistically significant. In terms of
profitability, manufacturing firms were significantly less profitable than non-manufacturing
firms (20.84% vs. 27.82%). On average, however, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms in the sample were quite profitable.
One would anticipate a different asset composition for manufacturing firms than for
firms in other industry sectors, specifically a higher level of fixed assets in the form of plant
and equipment. This proved to be the case, since manufacturing firms had a significantly higher
ratio of fixed assets to total assets than non-manufacturing firms (33.68% vs. 28.69%). In light
of the higher level of fixed assets that could be used as collateral, one would also anticipate a
higher level of debt, long term debt, and loans obtained from financial institutions. Table I
reveals that this was true in this instance, although the differences were not statistically
significant. Manufacturing firms had a ratio of total debt to total assets of 47.7 percent
compared to 43.14 percent for non-manufacturing firms. Similarly, they used a higher level of
long term debt to finance their assets, 24.82 percent compared to 22.73 percent. Finally,
manufacturing firms obtained a higher percentage of their loans from external sources (vs. trade
credit) than non-manufacturing firms (32.95% vs. 29.19%).
Table II provides further clarification on the use of loans by manufacturing firms and
the types of loans employed. It notes that a significantly higher percentage of manufacturing
firms were organized as limited liability entities, 58.72 percent compared to 43.72 percent.
This more “corporate” form of organization may serve as an advantage in securing external
capital since it may imply a higher level of organizational sophistication and staying power.
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Although there were no significant differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms in terms of the likelihood of having some type of loan (Haveloan), manufacturing firms
were significantly more likely to have a line of credit, lease, equipment loan, other loan, or a
loan from stockholders than non-manufacturing firms. Conversely, non-manufacturing firms
were significantly more likely to have a commercial mortgage. They were also more likely to
have a vehicle loan, although the difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms was not significant. These distinctions make sense, because manufacturing firms are
more likely to have assets that can be used for collateral for lines of credit, leases, equipment
loans, or other loans. Similarly, in the case of non-manufacturing firms, their sources of debt,
particularly long term debt, are dictated by the assets that they have available to secure them,
specifically commercial buildings or vehicles used for the business.
Surprisingly, a rather high percentage of manufacturing firms also used business credit
cards and personal credit cards as a source of financing for their business, and in the case of
business credit cards, the difference was significant. Table II reveals that 39.33 percent of
manufacturing firms used a business credit card compared to 33.6 percent of nonmanufacturing firms. In terms of personal credit cards, 48.71 percent of manufacturing firms
used them for business purposes compared to 45.76 percent of non-manufacturing firms.
Given the high interest rates associated with credit cards, one would expect firms to use them
only as a last resort. Alternatively, however, credit cards provide easy access to unsecured
credit and convenience which may override the disadvantage of their higher cost.
B.
Multivariate Analysis
Overall, the univariate findings indicate that manufacturing firms in the sample were
larger in terms of assets, sales, and employees, more capital intensive in terms of the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets, and less profitable as measured by return on sales. All of these
factors would seem to dictate a greater demand for external sources of capital, and possibly
different capital structure choices than one might find in non-manufacturing firms.
A
shortcoming of univariate analysis, however, is that it examines the effect of only one variable
in isolation. In contrast, multivariate analysis allows for the examination of several
independent variables acting in concert on the dependent variable, in this instance some
measure of capital structure. A regression model was developed to test the relationship
between various measures of capital structure and firm characteristics including size, age,
organizational status, profitability, asset structure, and industry sector. The model had the
following firm:
Model 1:
TDTA = a + b1logsales + b2firmage + b3org + b4ROS + b5FATA + b6manuf + e
The dependent variable, TDTA, represents the ratio of total debt to total assets and is
used in this instance as a measure of capital structure. Prior research suggests that smaller
firms are more reluctant to use external equity because they do not want to dilute ownership
control (Norton, 1991; Hutchinson, 1995). This would suggest a higher ratio of total debt to
total assets for small firms in general. The hypothesis of this research is that small
manufacturing firms in particular will have an even higher level of total debt to total assets than
small firms in other industries. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of earlier studies

112

Capital Structure in Small Manufacturing Firms… (Coleman)

conducted by Bradley et al. (1984), Hall et al. (2000), and Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias
(2000).
Independent variables are defined in the Appendix. Sales were used as a measure of
firm size since prior research indicates that larger firms have a greater demand for both debt
and equity thus implying a positive relationship between sales and the dependent variable (Cole
& Wolken, 1995; Gregory et al., 2005; Voulgaris et al., 2004). The logged form of the sales
variable was used (Logsales), since Table I revealed that sales were highly skewed. Firm age
was selected as a variable, because one would anticipate that younger firms that are still
growing would have a greater demand for capital than mature firms. Mature firms, having
lower growth rates, are often able to use retained earnings as a source of financing, and thus do
not require as much external financing (Gregory et al., 2005). If this relationship proves to be
the case, one would anticipate a negative sign for the variable “Firmage”. Organizational status
(Org) was used as an independent variable, because it may serve as an indication of
organizational sophistication and maturity. This, in turn, could provide greater access to
capital, implying a positive relationship between the variable “org” and the dependent variable.
Return on sales (ROS) was used as a measure of profitability. Unlike return of equity
(ROE), ROS is not directly affected by the firm’s capital structure. Similarly, unlike return on
assets (ROA), ROS is less likely to be determined by firm size. In contrast, return on sales
provides a fairly direct measure of the firm’s ability to manage expenses relative to revenues.
Prior research suggest that more profitable firms are less likely to require external sources of
capital, because retained earnings can be used as a major source of financing (Chittenden et al.,
1996; Michaelas et al., 1998). Thus one would anticipate a negative relationship between ROS
and the dependent variable.
As noted in Table II, manufacturing firms have a higher level of fixed assets than nonmanufacturing firms. This implies a greater need for sources of capital to finance those assets
which in turn can be used as collateral on loans (Esperanca et al., 2003; Sogorb, 2005),
suggesting a positive relationship between capital intensity and the use of debt. The ratio of
fixed assets to total assets (FATA) was used as a measure of asset structure. Finally, the
independent variable “Manuf” divides the sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms. The review of prior research cites several studies that found that capital structure is at
least partially determined by industry sector (Bradley et al., 1984; Hall et al. 2000; LopezGracia & Aybar-Arias, 2000). If this is the case, one would anticipate that manufacturing firms
are both willing and able to use higher levels of debt than non-manufacturing firms.
Manufacturing firms tend to be both larger and more capital intensive, both of which typically
lead to a higher demand for capital. Further, manufacturing firms may be easier for lenders to
understand and evaluate, because they produce tangible products using tangible assets. This is
in contrast to many service firms that rely on more difficult to grasp intangible assets and
human capital.
C.
Multivariate Results
The results of Model 1 are presented in Table III. Results reveal that significant
variables included measures of firm size, firm age, organizational status, profitability, and asset
structure. The industry variable was not, however, significant. The variable used to represent
firm size, Logsales, was significant and positive indicating that, on average, larger firms carry
higher levels of debt as suggested by prior research. Larger firms may be more attractive to
lenders because they take out larger loans which are, in turn, less labor intensive. Similarly, the
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mere size of larger firms may give the impression of greater stability and staying power.
Larger firms may also be in a better position to use trade credit as a source of financing,
because they can exert a greater degree of market power on their suppliers than smaller firms
can.
The variable representing firm age (Firmage) was significant and negative, as
anticipated, indicating that younger firms use a higher degree of leverage. This finding is
consistent with Berger & Udell’s (1998) Life Cycle Theory which states that firms use different
types of financing at different stages of their development. Younger firms that are still growing
may require capital to fund product development, facilities, or expansion. Similarly, as
younger firms, they are less likely to have earnings that could be used as a source of financing.
The variable representing organizational status (Org) was significant and positive. Thus, firms
organized as limited liability entities were more likely to use higher levels of debt. This could
be because the limited liability form of organization shields their owners from the risk of
personal bankruptcy. Alternatively, lenders may feel that firms organized as corporations or
limited partnerships have a higher level of sophistication and are less likely to experience
financial distress.
As suggested by prior research, the variable representing profitability (ROS) was
significant and negative. Profitable firms can self-fund from retained earnings as opposed to
using external sources of debt or equity. This finding is consistent with Myers’ Pecking Order
Theory which contends that firms prefer internal rather than external sources of financing. By
using retained earnings rather than new external equity, the original owners are able to retain
ownership and control, and they do not have to share future profits with new equity holders.
Further, by using retained earnings rather than debt, owner managers are able to avoid the risks
and restrictions that may accompany the use of debt. The use of debt increases the risk of
financial distress and bankruptcy, and lenders may also impose restrictive covenants which
limit the operating flexibility of the firm.
The variable measuring asset structure, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FATA)
was significant and positive, revealing that, as anticipated, firms with higher levels of fixed
assets carry higher levels of debt. Firms with high levels of fixed assets obviously need capital
to finance those assets which, in turn, can be used as collateral on loans. The availability of
collateral reduces the riskiness of the loan to the lender and may increase the availability of
capital to the borrower. In this sense, the availability of fixed assets that can be used as
collateral serves to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information noted by Ang (1992).
The variable representing industry classification (Manuf) was not significant, contrary
to prior research. In this study, industry classification by itself did not differentiate between
firms using different capital structures. Rather, specific firm characteristics, in this instance
size, age, organizational status, profitability, and asset structure, differentiated between firms
using higher and lower degrees of leverage.
D.
Further Analysis
Two additional models were constructed to further explore the relationship between
specific firm characteristics and capital structure. In the second model, the ratio of externally
obtained loans to total assets (Xloans) was used as the independent variable while in the third
model, the ratio of long term debt to total assets (LTDTA) was used as the dependent variable.
The models took the following form:
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Model 2
Xloans = a + b1logsales + b2firmage + b3org + b4ROS + b5FATA + b6manuf + e
and
Model 3
LTDTA = a + b1logsales + b2firmage + b3org + b4ROS + b5FATA + b6manuf + e
The results for Models 2 and 3 are also presented in Table III. In Model 2 the ratio of
externally obtained loans to total assets was used as the dependent variable and as a measure of
capital structure. External loans are typically obtained from a bank or some other type of
financial institution. Since bank loans are a major source of financing for small and mid-sized
firms, it is important to identify the firm characteristics that lead to obtaining them. The results
for Model 2 were very similar to those for Model 1. As in the earlier model, measures of firm
size, firm age, organizational status, profitability, and asset structure were significant while
industry classification was not. This implies that banks and other financial institutions prefer to
lend to companies that are larger, that have the corporate form of organization, and have assets
that can be used as collateral. Alternatively, younger firms are more likely to seek loans from
financial institutions, while more profitable firms are less likely to do so.
In Model 3, the dependent variable was the ratio of long term debt to total assets
(LTDTA). Firms that are able to use a higher level of long term debt are protected from the
dual risks of credit availability and interest rate fluctuations. Unlike short term debt which can
be called or cancelled at any point in time depending on the condition of the economy, the
lender, or the individual company, long term debt is in place for a period of time; the company
does not have to worry about renewing it or keeping it. Similarly, unlike short term debt, long
term debt does not re-price frequently in a rising rate environment. Thus, owner/managers can
forecast the level of interest expense more accurately are and less likely to be caught a profit
squeeze that could result from both declining revenues and rising interest rates.
In this model neither the size variable (Logsales) nor the industry variable (Manuf) were
significant. Unlike the first two models, larger firms were no more likely to carry higher levels
or long term debt than smaller firms. This is an interesting finding, because it suggests that
long term debt is actually more available to smaller firms than short term debt which is, in fact,
more risky. This may be because long term debt is typically secured by specific assets, whereas
short term debt is typically unsecured. Because of the greater risk associated with smaller
firms, those firms may only be able to obtain debt that is secured by specific assets. This would
mean that they are less reliant on lines of credit and trade credit, the major sources of
unsecured, short term debt. As in the first two models, the variable representing industry sector
(Manuf) was not significant. Thus, as previously noted, simply being a manufacturing firm
does not necessarily lead to a higher levels of long term debt.
V.

Summary and Conclusions
The most important finding of this research is that industry sector on its own does not
dictate the capital structure of small firms. In this sense, these results conflict with the findings
of prior research. Rather, these findings demonstrate that capital structure is determined by
firm characteristics including size, age, organizational status, profitability, and asset structure.
Larger firms tend to use as higher percentage of debt as do firms organized as limited liability
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entities. Larger firms are more attractive to lenders, because they would typically take out
larger and, hence, more profitable, loans. Similarly, larger firms have a higher degree of
market power, and are thus in a better position to use trade credit as a source of financing.
Firms organized as corporations may have more sophisticated systems of financial management
and reporting which may give them an advantage in dealing with lenders.
These findings reveal that younger firms also tend to have higher debt ratios, probably
because they are still growing and are not yet at the point where they can generate sufficient
earnings to self-fund. In this sense, these results are consistent with Berger and Udell’s (1998)
Life Cycle Theory which states that firms use different sources of capital at different stages of
their development. Conversely, more profitable firms use lower levels of debt, because they
are able to self-fund with retained earnings. Thus, these findings are consistent with Myers’
Pecking Order Theory (1984) which contends that firms prefer to use internal equity first as a
source of financing before turning to external sources of debt or equity. Myers further contends
that firms are particularly averse to using external equity, because it requires them to relinquish
ownership and control. The use of retained earnings as a funding source by profitable firms
may also provide support for Leland and Pyle’s (1977) Signaling Theory which states that
when firm owners are optimistic about the prospects for their firms, they prefer to reinvest their
own earnings rather than sharing future profits and ownership with outside investors.
These results also reveal that asset structure is an important determinant of capital
structure. Firms with a high ratio of fixed assets to total assets use higher levels of total debt,
external loans, and long term debt. This finding makes sense, since one would anticipate that
capital intensive firms would have a greater demand for external capital to fund their higher
level of fixed assets. Similarly, capital intensive firms may be more attractive to lenders,
because of the presence of assets that can be used as collateral. The use of collateral is one of
the ways in which firms and lenders can at least partially alleviate the problem of asymmetric
information noted by Ang (1992). Although capital intensity is a characteristic of the
manufacturing sector, it is also a characteristic of other industry sectors, i.e. transportation and
construction, as well as many types of retail and service firms. These findings seem to imply
that asset structure rather than industry sector is what drives capital structure.
An important implication of these findings is that firms with higher levels of fixed
assets, which include manufacturing firms, do use and require higher levels of external capital
in the form of debt financing. This implies a demand for both available and affordable sources
of debt capital. Earlier in this article, the importance of manufacturing to the economy overall
was noted. In recent years, that sector has been thriving; sales and profits have been strong,
and globalization has opened up many new markets for U.S. firms. Simultaneously, there has
been a lot of liquidity in the banking sector, and interest rates have been low. This availability
and affordability of capital has enabled small and mid-sized manufacturing firms to purchase
equipment, develop new products and processes, add employees, and grow. As we move into a
more mature phase of the business cycle, accompanied by slowing demand and higher interest
rates, it will be important to monitor the continued availability bank debt, in particular, to
ensure that smaller firms are able to obtain sufficient capital to remain competitive in both
domestic and global markets.
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Appendix
Definition of Variables

Total Assets: Total assets for 1998
Total Sales: Total sales for 1998
Total Employees: Total number of workers for 1998
Firm Age (Firmage): Age of the firm expressed in years
ROS: Return on sales; net income divided by total sales (1998). Firms with negative profits
were assigned an ROS of 0. Firms with an ROS of greater than 100 percent were assigned an
ROS of 100 percent.
FATA: The ratio of fixed assets to total assets (1998)
TDTA: The ratio of total debt to total assets (1998)
LTDTA: The ratio of long term debt to total assets (1998). Long term debt is defined in this
instance as the sum of leases, mortgages, vehicle loans, equipment loans, other loans, and
stockholder loans.
Xloans: The ratio of loans obtained from external sources to total assets
Organization (Org): Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was organized as some
type of limited liability entity, i.e. a corporation or and limited partnership
Have Loan: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had one of the six types of loans
tracked by the SSBF; line of credit, financial lease, commercial mortgage, equipment loan,
vehicle loan, or other loan
Line of Credit: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had a line of credit
Lease: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had a financial lease
Commercial Mortgage: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had a commercial
mortgage
Vehicle Loan: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had a vehicle loan
Equipment Loan: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had an equipment loan
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Appendix
Definition of Variables
(continued)
Other Loan: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had some other type of loan
Stockholder Loan: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had some type of loan
from a stockholder
Bus. Credit Card: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm owner had a business credit
card that was used for business purposes
Pers. Credit Card: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm owner had a personal credit
card that was used for business purposes
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Table I
Characteristics of Small Manufacturing Firms included in the 1998 SSBF
Manuf.

Non-Manuf.

T statistic

Prob>t

Number

389

3172

Total Assets**
Mean
Median

958,839
96,977

364,708
51,150

4.91

0.0001

Total Sales**
Mean
Median

1,980,0000
201,476

893,582
148,417

2.82

0.0049

Total Employees**
Mean
Median

14.47
4.0

8.04
3.0

4.58

0.0001

Firm Age
Mean
Median

14.10
11.0

13.27
11.0

1.24

0.2156

Median
Mean

20.84%
10.20%

27.82%
18.58%

3.98

0.0001

FA/TA**
Mean
Median

33.68%
27.20%

28.69%
15.41%

2.62

0.0087

Mean
Median

47.70%
42.81%

43.14%
33.58%

1.86

0.0630

LTD/TA
Mean
Median

24.82%
5.46%

22.73%
.71%

1.01

0.3124

32.95%
14.23%

29.19%
8.2%

1.66

0.0962

ROS**

TD/TA

Xloans
Mean
Median

**differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms were significant at the .01 level
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Table II
Characteristics of Small Manufacturing Firms included in the 1998 SSBF
Manuf.

Non-Manuf.

Chi-square

Prob>Chisquare

Number

389

3172

Organization**

58.72%

43.72%

24.7250

0.0001

Have Loan

58.54%

54.73%

1.6001

0.2059

Line of Credit**

34.22%

27.11%

6.8551

0.0088

Lease**

16.70%

10.04%

12.7348

0.0004

Commercial Mort.** 7.64%

13.69%

8.7014

0.0032

Vehicle Loan

18.08%

20.71%

1.1510

0.2833

Equipment Loan**

16.48%

9.30%

15.7309

0.0001

Other Loan**

17.21%

9.17%

19.8433

0.0001

Stockholder Loan** 24.65%

13.29%

28.7453

0.0001

Bus. Credit Card*

39.33%

33.60%

3.9851

0.0459

Pers. Credit Card

48.71%

45.76%

0.9569

0.3280

*differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms were significant at the .05
level
**differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms were significant at the .01
level
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Table III
Multivariate Analysis: Measures of Capital Structure
Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variables
TDTA

Xloans

LTD/TA

Intercept

0.1180**

0.1811**

0.2026**

Logsale s

0.0300**

0.0087**

0.0001

Firmage

-0.0045**

-0.0035**

-0.0031**

Org

0.1262**

0.1039**

0.0863**

ROS

-0.1658**

-0.1199**

-0.0721**

FA/TA

0.0463*

0.1341**

0.1549**

Manuf

-0.0038

0.0061

-0.0142

R-square

0.1339

0.695

0.0534

Pr>F

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

Independent
Variables

*results significant at the .05 level
**results significant at the .01 level

